Strategic assessment on terrorism 2018
Citation:
Box, M. (2017). Strategic assessment on terrorism 2018. Retrieved from www.scholaratlarge.com
Paper:
Terrorism has
been a major issue in political discourse in Australia since the 2001 9/11
attacks on the United States. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the
future of terrorism in Australia over the next five years. This is a
forecasting paper which is based on the proposition that the future can be
forecast by reflecting on patterns in history and that trends which are
occurring in the present will continue. The caveat to this proposition is that
there are always significant events – such as 9/11 -- that cause a pivot. Nevertheless,
it is important to acknowledge that in its most recent publicly available
report ASIO (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p. 17) highlights that the threat
remains probable and is likely to continue as such into the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, it is alluded to in that report that right wing nationalists/’patriots’
are becoming an increased concern (p. 19). Taking account of that assessment,
this paper will be broken into essentially two parts. The first section will explore
the future of the Jihadist terrorist threat with the assumption that the
Islamic State ultimately loses effective control of the territory it controls
in northern Iran and Syria and hence its position as a statelet (Cronin, 2015, p. 88). The second section will explore the emergence of
far right groups as a possible source of terrorist threat. It should be
remembered that right wing ideologies (right for life) were responsible for a
terrorist attack on a Melbourne abortion clinic in 2001 (ABC (local radio), 2001) and a member of the
anti-Islam group Reclaim is awaiting trial on terrorism offences (Davey, 2016).
However, before this examination commences it is important to have a brief
recap regarding terrorism and give an outline of the methodology used.
Terrorism. It
is important that any discussion regarding terrorism has a clear foundation;
however, such a discussion would be well beyond the scope of this paper so as a
consequence a short survey of the literature on terrorist motives is contained
in Annex A. Based upon that review it is argued that terrorism is made up of
the following elements:
1. preformed by an irregular non-state
actor wishing to achieve a political/politico-religious aim;
2. targets non-combatants to cause fear
so as to force them to undertake or refrain from undertaking a political action; and
3. produce an overreaction by
government so as to undermine its legitimacy.
This is reflected in the official
definition of terrorism in Australia which can be found in the Criminal Code Act 1996 (Cth) section 101.1(1)
“… ‘terrorist act’ means an action or threat of action where: … (b) the action is done or the threat is
made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological
cause; and (c) the action is done or the threat is made with
the intention of: (i) coercing, or influencing by intimidation, the
government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or foreign country, or of
part of a State, Territory or foreign country; or (ii)
intimidating the public or a section of the public.”
Methodology. This paper has been based
upon a mixed methods approach. Initially the most recently available annual
reports of ASIO (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016) and the AFP (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017) where assessed to determine
the current trends in the terrorist threat. These trends where then used to
conduct literature searchers using a snowball approach. Environmental scanning
tools were assessed -- particularly PESTLE and Force Field Analysis – to
determine which best suited to this project. Force Field Analysis (with
elements of brainstorming and What if? analysis) was chosen as it was believed
to be best suited to the data collected in the literature search. The diagram
produced in this process is reproduced as Annex B.
Jihadist Terrorism.
According to the
ASIO assessment (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p. 22), whilst the Islamic State
remains the main source of terrorist threats -- either directly through
affiliates or through self-radicalised devotees -- al-Qaeda remains a
consistent threat particularly in Africa. As the Islamic State continues to
loose territory, and with the fall of its strong holds in Mosul and Raqqa, the
question arises what will happen to the large number of foreign fighters who
have been drawn to its caliphate? McCabe (2017, p. 97) highlights that it will be difficult if not
impossible for the foreign fighters who are not from the region -- in
particular those from the west -- to blend into the population as the caliphate
falls and form an underground resistance. This will not be a safe place for
them with Kurds, Shia and Assad regime forces, not to mention ordinary Sunnis
caught up in the regimes terror, will want to exact their revenge. Furthermore,
in the aftermath of the 1980s conflict in Afghanistan against the Soviets, many
fighters chose to return to their home countries continuing the conflict in a
different guise (Byman, 2016, pp. 79-80). As a result it is argued
that these fighters will either defect (either to another Jihadist group such
as al-Qaeda or to the government), disengage or form an underground Islamic
State inspired wave of domestic terrorism.
Defection
to the government. This proposition involves the returning fighters
defecting so to and assist government agencies particularly renouncing the
proposition for change though violent jihad. The notion is not as implausible
as one might think even for seasoned fighters. For example, after supporting
and participating in armed struggle through terrorist means to overthrow the Mubarak
regime in Egypt, on mass members of the Islamic Group renounced that struggle
and urged others to do the same (Wright, 2008).
The circumstances which faced the members of the Islamic Group are not dissimilar
to that which will face returning Islamic State fighters: long or indefinite
detention. For instance, Lynch, McGarrity, and Williams (2015, pp. 84, 86-87) outline that having been
present in a declared area, the returnees are liable for a life sentence.
Cooperating with law enforcement authorities in the way the Islamic Group
members did may be a prudent option to minimalised an inevitable sentence or
increase the probability of parole (Bronitt & McSherry, 2005, p. 42). This is further the case
when the control order regime is taken into account (Lynch et al., 2015, p. 171) including being the target of
the security forces such as the ‘Returning Terrorist Suspects Team’ which the
AFP has established to coordinate the Australian Government response to interdicting
returning fighters (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 70). For example, media have been
reporting that an eighteen year old Australian captioned by Lebanese forces
attempting to join Islamic State is now providing information security forces
and western intelligence agencies (Whinnett, 2017). Furthermore, Speckhard, Shajkovci, and Yayla (2017, p. 86) conclude that the “… most
credible voices to raise against ISIS are those of insiders – ISIS defectors –
who have seen the cruel reality of life under the Islamic State and the
ISIS-controlled territories…” making such defectors a valuable resource.
Defection to other Jihadist Groups. Stern and Berger (2016, p. 179) explain that in the Jihadists
pledge allegiance through a process known as Bayah; however, “Bayah is extended
from leader to leader, not group to group, so when the players change, it must
be renewed.” As a consequence should the Islamic State leader Baghdadi be
killed – which seems highly likely – then those who have pledged loyalty to him
would be freed from that commitment unless they make a new Bayah with his
successor. This was a similar phenomenon that occurred in the transition of
affiliations following the death of bin Laden with many turning to Islamic
State. Cronin (2015, pp. 93-94) outlines that Islamic State attracted people
by offering them adventure and short term gratification as well as being
associated with its overwhelming success.
McCabe (2017, p. 98) further adds
that the Islamic State propaganda was highly attractive when they were victors;
however, it is going to be very difficult to maintain from defeat. McCabe (2017, p. 98) argues that a major impediment to Islamic State
in the future will be to counter this point: if they had the support of Allah
why there was no intervention on their behalf. However, Speckhard et al. (2017, p. 84) argue returning home the foreign
fighters will find it difficult to adjust given the “… emotional arousal from
the battlefield experiences …” which “… the calm, bored annul of being back
home …” will not match. The authors argue that they will thrive for “… a clear
purpose and cause.” Therefore, despite them possibly being disenfranchised with
Islamic State they may become vulnerable for recruitment by other groups such
as the historic precedent of the Afghan Arabs.
Underground domestic wave. An
alternative to leaving Islamic State could be that devotees continue the fight
back home. Speckhard et al. (2017, pp. 81-82) argue that whilst Islamic
State is losing ground on the battlefield it is winning ground in the digital
one continuing to attract followers through its online narratives. ASIO
highlighted that those radicalised online and have not visited the Middle East
theatre pose a significant threat of terrorism in Australia with all of those
involved in both disrupted and committed terrorist acts having been radicalised
in this way (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p. 19). As a consequence, it is
suggested that even with defeat of the physical caliphate it is possible that
the Islamic State will continue since the group has been apt at reinventing
itself after a major setback only to come back stronger. For instance, Cronin (2015, p. 89) points out that after the group was almost wiped
out in 2006 following cooperation between United States forces and Sunni tribal
groups they were able to reform in United States military prisons. Therefore,
it is suggested that this adaptability may occur in cyberspace with them
utilising their skill in harnessing social media platforms.
Right wing groups
The first half
of this paper has focused upon jihadist terrorist threats, particularly that of
the Islamic State. Nonetheless, there is an often neglected group which has
consistently been a threat right wing groups. Klein, Gruenewald, and Smith (2016, p. 225) argue to “…develop informed strategies
for countering violent extremism, [it] is necessary to understand the various threats
posed by far-right terrorists.” Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013, p. 67) go further, arguing that in the United States
“…most loaner attacks have been committed by far-rights and many argued that
such attacks are increasing.” Their reference to loaners was because they were
the focus of the particular study; however, there is nothing to suggest that
the phenomenon is any different for right wing groups in general. For instance,
they cite figures from the United States Extremist Crime Database which show
for the period 1990 to 2010 140 homicide incidents were committed by the far
right whilst only 30 were committed by Jihadists (excluding 9/11) (p 67). Furthermore,
Chermak, Freilich, and Simone (2010, p. 2021) argue that 85 percent of terrorist incidents
in the United States are committed by far-right domestic groups.
Gruenewald et al. (2013, p. 67) go on to note that these hate
groups tending to connect through the use of social media with like-minded
individuals. This is an interest observation as it is exactly the same method
which Islamic State is using to radicalise people in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p. 17). Furthermore, this is
particularly relevant as Chermak et al. (2010, p. 2025) report in the United States
there had been some cooperation between Jihadist groups, with some far-right
groups seeing “… that any enemy of the U.S. government and the Jews was worthy
of their support.” Although these studies have not particularly mentioned
Australia it is argued that they are pertinent due to ASIO having highlighted the
rise of such groups in Australia poses a significant risk. Two aspects of
far-right groups have been identified and it is theorised may pose a threat to
Australia in the future: Sovereign Citizens and religious groups.
Sovereign Citizens. Sovereign Citizens
originate in the United States and have an ideology which is opposed to
government, especially federal, controls over their activities. According to Dean Alexander (2016) they do not particularly share any religious
outlook but focus on the illegitimacy of government and the right to individual
autonomy. It is their aim to break the link between the government and the
individual to ensure and promote greater autonomy and freedom. As a consequence,
they believe that government regulation must be on an opt-in basis and hence if
an individual wishes they can ignore requests of police, taxation officials and
local government. The Sydney Criminal Lawyers (2016) argue that the Sovereign
Citizens equate statute law with maritime law and hence it has no legitimacy on
dry land: the only true law being common law. They establish their own common
law courts to determine what the law free from statute actually is (Dean Alexander, 2016). Blanco (2014)
argues that the “… sovereign citizen movement is considered the top threat for
domestic terrorism according to a survey of state, local and tribal law
enforcement agencies.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010) concurs with that assessment.
In their report
for 730 (ABC (21), 2015), Thomas and McGregor demonstrated that the
Sovereign Citizen movement has become established in Australia. In a NSW Police report the journalists
obtained, it is outlined that as many as three hundred members of the movement
are resident in that state and they are increasing at an expeditious rate. The
police report also stated that group has “… the motivation and capability to
act against government interests and should be considered a potential terrorist
threat.” Police intelligence reports articulated in the story outline that “… incidents
involving sovereign citizens in Australia ranges from displaying homemade
registration plates and ‘plans to use paint bombs to disrupt court
proceedings’, to making plans to kidnap a judge, judicial officials and a
police officer.” These are not theoretical threats, for instance in 2014 a NSW
Environment Department compliance and regulation officer was shoot and killed
trying to gather evidence of illegal clearing (Woodburn & McNally, 2014). The tendency for those with
sympathies for Sovereign Citizen ideology to become more active may have been
increased with the exclusion from the Senate of One Nation candidates Malcolm
Roberts and Rod Culleton both of whom have similarities to the groups
ideologies particularly Roberts (Wilson, 2016)
leaving the devotees feeling disenfranchised.
Furthermore, Sydney Criminal Lawyers (2016) outlined that Sovereign
Citizen ideology “… has been embraced by Indigenous communities; a natural fit
for people who have never accepted sovereignty.” They quote Mark McMurtrie who
is promoting the ‘Original Sovereign Tribal Foundation’: “‘Our tribes are
sovereign … Not one piece of legislation
of the crown has any authority over any person. If a court is going to exercise
any of the powers attaching a right of ownership over me, forcing me to accept
any right of punishment over me, then I will be addressing the matter from a
point of view of slavery.’” This is a concerning development given the
arguments made by activists such as Mansell (2015)
that indigenous people should be given autonomy in a seventh state and the
rejection of the Uluru Declaration proposal for an indigenous advisory body to
be included in the constitution (Brennan, 2017). This could see collaboration between these
disaffected groups and jihadists in the same way right wing groups have been
attracted to their fight against a common enemy.
Religious right. The religious-right ideology has already
been responsible for one terrorist attack in Australia in recent years: the 2001
shooting at an East Melbourne abortion clinic (ABC (local radio), 2001). This incident is similar to
that which had occurred in the United States: the man entered the clinic pulled
a rifle and shot dead a security guard before being tackled to the ground.
There are three events in political discourse which are occurring which may
inflame the supporters of these groups: (i) protest exclusion zones around
abortion clinics, (ii) marriage equality, and (iii) assisted dieing. For
instance, in their monitoring of the debate leading up to the same-sex
plebiscite Tilley and Hoad (2017) show that the majority of
violence, threats or property damage in that debate has been associated with
the ‘no’ debate on religious grounds. Furthermore, there are claims –
particularly from the former prime minister Tony Abbott -- that even a no loss
in the survey with a significant descent (>40%) would be a victory and the
start of a new conservative movement (Barlow, 2017).
Therefore, it is argued that these developments may be a push factor toward
further violence.
Conclusion
This paper has
examined the propensity for terrorism to continue to be a threat within
Australia over the next five years. Based on an assessment utilising the Force
Field Analysis tool it has been argued that both Jihadist and Right Wing groups
will continue to pose a threat and in some cases may collaborate. The driving
forces for this phenomena are the polarised political discourse which is
currently occurring accompanied by a lack of perceived opportunity to have
their ‘rightful’ views acknowledge. A further driving force is the
psychological need for the ‘buzz’ which their previous involvement particularly
in the Middle East theatre gave. Restraining forces are the actions taken by
security forces to detect and prosecute those involved in these activities as
well as disillusion following losses particularly by Islamic State. Access to
firearms is a particular driving force for terrorists incidents particularly in
intensity (Legault & Hendrickson, 2009, p. 551); however, the tough firearms
laws in Australia may be a restraining force. Nevertheless, it is argued that
these restraints to not negate the driving forces and hence the threat although
evolving will continue.
Annex A – Motivations
of terrorists.
Author
|
Contribution to understanding of terrorists motives
|
Cary (2009)
|
Outlines that terrorists
are “. . . determent to impose their will upon others. Unlike nation states .
. . terrorists resort to violence as the first and final solution...” (p.
13).
|
David Alexander and Klein (2003)
|
“Terrorism is psychological warfare…” (p. 494).
|
Gearson (2002)
|
Argues that the
essence of terrorism is the utilisation of fear. The ability to cause fear is
an important element of terrorism as fear and panic will undermine public
resolve or cause an overreaction that undermines legitimacy (p. 8).
|
Hoffman (2006)
|
“By distinguishing terrorists from other types of criminal
and irregular fighters and … other forms of crime and irregular warfare, …
terrorism is:
·
ineluctably political in aims and motives;
·
violent – or, equally important, threatens
violence;
·
designed to have far-reaching psychological
repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;
·
conducted either by
o
an organization with an identifiable chain of
command or conspiratorial cell structure …
o
individuals or a small collection of
individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological
aims or example of some existent terrorist movements and/or its leaders; and
·
perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate
entity…” (p. 40).
|
Hope (1977)
|
In his report into Australian intelligence and security
agencies remarked that “Terrorism may
be so widespread as to approach a state of civil war; it may be isolated or
irregular and have a limited direct effect upon the country in which it is
manifested in violent action…” (p. 59).
|
Kilcullen (2010)
|
Argues that terrorism
is “… politically motivated violence against civilians, conducted with
the intention to coerce through fear…” and it “…is a component in almost all
insurgencies, and insurgent objectives … lie behind almost all nonstate
terrorism…. ” (p. 184).
|
Manningham-Buller (2003)
|
The former head
of British intelligence agency MI5 argues, “[n]ormal life is what the
terrorist seeks to destroy and creating fear is part of their agenda…”(p. 3).
|
Pinto and Wardlaw (1989)
|
Argue terrorism has two broad goals:
1.
to induce widespread fear in the population;
and
2.
provoke the government to overreact and
thereby undermine their legitimacy (p. 4).
|
Richardson (2006)
|
Summed up the motives as to achieve:
1.
revenge: the grievance directed towards the
perception of a wrong whether that is actual or imagined (p. 113);
2.
renown: achieving publicity to the cause and
spread fear (p. 120); and
3.
reaction: the ‘propaganda by deed’ sending a
message to instil fear and cause a response based upon fear (pp. 128-129).
|
Stern and Berger (2016)
|
“… define terrorism as an act or threat of violence
against noncombatants, with the object of extracting revenge, intimidating,
or otherwise influencing an audience…” (pp 9-10). They further add that there
are two characteristics which distinguish terrorism from other forms of
violence:
1.
it is aimed at noncombatants; and
2.
is designed for dramatic effect where causing
fear is more important than the physical act (p. 10).
|
Tucker (1999)
|
Classifies
terrorist motives into four main groups:
These motivations are not necessarily mutually
exclusive (p. 501).
|
Weimann (2006)
|
In a survey of
academic writings on terrorism, Schmid and Jongman found the following key
elements:
8. the use of fear and anxiety (p.
21).
|
White (2009)
|
Sums up terrorism in simple terms consisting of three
parts:
1.
use of force;
2.
against innocent people; and
3.
for political purposes (p. 10).
|
Wilkinson (2011)
|
“Terrorism can be conceptually and empirically
distinguished from other modes of violence and conflict by the following
characteristics:
1.
It is premeditated and designed to create a
climate of extreme fear;
2.
It is directed at a wider target than the
immediate victims;
3.
It inherently involves attacks on random or
symbolic targets, including civilians;
4.
It is considered by the society in which it
occurs as ‘extra-normal’, that is in the literal sense that it violates the
norms regulating disputes, protests and dissent; and
5.
It is used primarily, though not exclusively,
to influence the political behaviour of governments, communities or specific
social groups…” (p. 6)
|
Williams (2004)
|
Defines terrorism as “. . . politically . . . motivated
violence, directed generally against non-combatants, intended to shock and
terrify, to achieve strategic outcomes…”(p 7). Strategic outcomes are usually
to polarise the population, undermine the government, or cause government
forces to react violently (p. 9).
|
Annex B – Force Field
Analysis
Driving forces →
|
←Restraining forces
|
|
Growth of Islamic State affiliates →
|
Terrorist
Threat
|
|
← Islamic State loss of Mosul and Raqqa
|
||
Difficulty of foreign fighters to blend into Middle East
society and go underground →
|
← Difficulty of foreign fighters to
blend into Middle East society and go underground
|
|
← Foreign Fighters legislation
|
||
← Seek mitigation in criminal proceedings
|
||
← Targeted by police and intelligence agencies
|
||
← Death of Baghdadi (leader of Islamic State)
|
||
Need for adventure and sense of purpose →
|
||
← Why didn’t Allah come to Islamic State’s aid?
|
||
Difficulty adjusting to everyday life after being a
foreign fighter →
|
||
Islamic State use of social media to radicalise →
|
← Voices of dissatisfaction of returned foreign
fighters
|
|
← Losses of prestige of being victorious
(Islamic State)
|
||
Growth of extreme-right wing in United States →
|
||
United State right wing groups creating a virtual
‘community’ through social media →
|
||
Cooperation between Jihadists and extreme-right wing
against a common enemy →
|
||
Expeditious growth of Sovereign Citizens in Australia →
|
||
Section 44 issues excluding One Nation Party Senators →
|
← One Nation Party giving a legitimate menace
for conservative/right wing voice
|
|
Failure of Indigenous recognition process →
|
||
Rejection of Uluru Declaration →
|
||
Marriage equality plebiscite →
|
||
Right to die legislation/debate in Victoria →
|
||
Exclusion zones prevention anti-abortion protests →
|
||
Calls for a new ‘conservative way’ →
|
||
Access to firearms →
|
← National, uniformed and strict firearms laws
|
|
Felling of being disenfranchised →
|
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