Title:
Introduction to moral panics.
Citation:
Box, M.
(2019). Introduction to moral panics.
www.scholaratlarge.com
Course:
Doctor of Philosophy. Federation University
Abstract:
This paper
introduces the concept of moral panics in the context of a study of national security
policy. It is an extract of a wider document prepared as part of the
conformation of candidature process for a Doctor of Philosophy
Paper:
The term ‘moral panic’ came to
prominence in criminological discourse through the work of Stanley Cohen regarding
the way deviant behaviour was politicised. Of importance, Cohen
(2002, p. viii) is clear that to call something a
moral panic does not imply a rejection of the phenomenon in question rather
that “... the ‘thing’s’ extent and significance has been exaggerated (a) itself
… and/or (b) compared with other, more serious problems.” Pearce
and Charman (2011) argue that there is not a unified
theory of moral panics, rather it is a concept which builds upon other
criminological theories such as labelling theory. White
and Haines (2000) outline succinctly that labelling
theory sees crime as a social construct and what and who is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is
determined by human interactions. This is something with which Young
(2009) concurs, stating that the deviance
is not inherent in behaviour or action but is something which is ‘bestowed’
upon it by the labelling of others. From a consequentialist perspective such
points may not be a negative in an overall policy setting; by contrast, from a deontological
perspective such labelling would go to the heart of the moral authority of the
policy. Young goes on to argue that a tell-tail-sign of a moral panic is the
amplification of stereotypes which are grossly disproportionate to the event or
activity in question. This is in
concurrence with the argument of Brass
(1976) that the nationalist leader sets
about placing their group apart from another. Furthermore, the similarity with
the third aspect of the motivations of terrorism is stark: that is the causing of
an overreaction which will be discussed in the next section. This mutually
supportive factor is why this tripartite of theories has utility for this research.
Howarth
(2013, p. 689)
argues that “…moral panics are more than expressions of outrage and
misrepresentation by elites intended to reinforce dominant practices by
demonising of outsiders and marginalised groups … [rather it is a] response to
perceived danger, and heightened anxiety...”. Nevertheless, he goes on to argue
that media in essence place themselves as a ‘moral entrepreneur, public
protector and guard of public morality’ which creates a ‘media superstorm’ with
“…highly emotive, evocative and mutually reinforcing discourse …”(p. 695).
Dagistanli
and Milivojevic (2013, p. 230) bring an interesting contribution to
this discussion as they see this notion of a moral panic being the product of
“… moral entrepreneurs – such as the media, politicians, police and other
criminal justice actors – who assert a self-proclaimed right to determine what
is deviant or against the norm of society.” This is an important contribution
as it opens the concept of moral panics to include an array of actors rather than
focusing solely on the media: political actors and the media are the focus of
this project. Soothill
(1998, p. 25) argues that these actors ‘react out
of proportion’ and a misrepresent of the facts. The overreaction is something which
Morgan
et al. (2010, pp. 582-583) highlight: after the ‘moral
entrepreneurs’ “…the state’s reaction … should be out of proportion to the
magnitude of threat posed.” Of significant relevance to this study is their
argument that the moral panic is an apt descriptor of reactions to the current
intensity of terrorism: “…we argue the concept of moral panic has utility for
our analysis; not least since the ‘war on terror’, involving as it does a
Manichean struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’…” (p. 596).
In summary, it
is argued that a moral panic is a phenomenon brought about by heightened public
fear of a perceived threat: the reality of which is immaterial. The demonised
group is seen as the cause of the threat to social norms which creates a call
for action from the public, led in most cases by the media or sections thereof.
In response to that call, the government will react in a manner which itself is
disproportionate to the threat: in essence the reaction is a political response
to the call for action rather than a considered piece of public policy which could
ultimately undermine the very essence of national security which the political
actor is claiming to be attempting to protect.
References:
Brass, P. (1976).
Ethnicity and Nationality Formation. Ethnicity, 3, 225-241.
Cohen, S. (2002). Folk Devils
and Morial Panics: The creation of the Mods and Rockers. Routledge
Classics.
Dagistanli, S., & Milivojevic, S. (2013). Appropriating the
rights of women: Moral panics, victims and exclusionary agendas in domestic and
cross-borders sex crimes. Women's Studies
International Forum, 40, 230-242.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2013.09.001
Howarth, A. (2013). A ‘superstorm’: when moral panic and new risk
discourses converge in the media. Health,
Risk & Society, 15(8),
681-698. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698575.2013.851180
Morgan, G., Dagistanli, S., & Martin, G. (2010). Global Fears,
Local Anxiety: Policing, Counterterrorism and Moral Panic Over ‘Bikie Gang
Wars’ in New South Wales. The Australian
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology,
43(3), 580–599.
Pearce, J. M., & Charman, E. (2011). A social psychological
approach to understanding moral panic. Crime,
Media, Culture, 7(3), 293-311. https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659011417607
Soothill, K. (1998). Crime and the Media: A Vicious Circle? AQ: Australian Quarterly, 70(2), 24-29.
White, R., & Haines, F. (2000). Crime and Criminology: an introduction (2nd ed.). Oxford University
Press.
Young, J. (2009). Moral Panic: Its Origins in Resistance,
Ressentiment and the Translation of Fantasy into Reality. British Journal of Criminology,
49(1), 4-16. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azn074
