Title:
Is it possible to deradicalise terrorists?
Citation:
Box, M. (2016). Is it possible to deradicalise terrorists? Retrieved from www.scholaratlarge.com
Paper:
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility that terrorists can be deradicalised. In the last entry of his book History’s Greatest Hits, Joseph Cummins (2007) describes the incident which has become known as 9/11: the attacks by al-Qaeda on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. This was an event which would, in Cummin’s words, “… transform the world…” (p 308) dominating geo-political events to the present day. The question which has generated considerable discussion – in both academic circles as well as the public at large – is why a group of outwardly westernised individuals would do such an act. As the decade wore on and events evolved the fear of terrorism grow greater and greater. Australia has seen:
1.
commitment to two significant and ongoing military
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq;
2.
foreign interests the target of terrorist attacks in
South East Asia;
3.
domestic plots being discovered;
4.
treat alert levels increasing with direr predictions;
and
5.
terrorist attacks occurring in both Melbourne and
Sydney.
Terrorism has become a significant part of life: for
instance, the Lord Mayor of Melbourne Robert Doyle (personal communications, 13
January 2015) commented: “We work
closely with our emergency services to plan, coordinate and monitor safety in
our city, particularly when we host major events, such as New Year’s Eve, which
attracted more than 450,000 people to the CBD.” These events dominate the
media. A search of the popular Melbourne radio station 3AW’s website reveals
that there is concern about the radicalisation of primary school students whose
parents are fighting with Daesh in the Middle East (‘Radicalisation’, 2015). Now
there is debate about whether primary school aged children who have been taken
by their parents when they went to fight for Daesh should be allowed to return.
Is it possible that these students can be deradicalised? This paper will first
look at the theories which lay behind the phenomena of terrorism and then more
specifically at radicalisation, deradicalisation and contrast it with
disengagement and reconciliation. The paper will then explore examples of
deradicalisation in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. At this point
criminological theories will be introduced then contrasted against policies
being introduced as part of the War on Terror. However, first ‘case studies’ will be introduced which provide
an understanding of what is hoped could be deradicalised.
Case Studies.
The first example comes from the second wave of Jihadist
associated with al-Qaeda: those responsible for the Madrid bombing (M-11).
Spain is within the Islamic sphere of influence desired by al-Qaeda as it was previously
controlled by the Umayyad Caliphate at the height of its power between the eighth
and twelfth centuries AD (Doognue, and Kirkwood, 2005, p137). With this
heritage it is not surprising that Spain has attracted immigrants from Muslim
North Africa: especially the case after violence broke out in Algeria in 1992 (Jordon
and Horsburgh, 2005, p170). It was the first generation from this wave of
migration which the M-11 bombers emerged: a decentralised network with
connections both internationally and nationally with like-minded individuals.
The war in Bosnia played an important role as those “… members of the network
who had fought in Bosnia organised excursions, trips and weekend breaks outside
Madrid…” where they trained for Jihad (p177). The suffering of Muslim women and
children at the perceived hands of western powers was inspirational to this
group: after M-11 and on the eve of the Spanish general election they released
a video “… threatening more killings and attacks because of the support Spain
had given to the United States on the War on Terror…” (p 175) Spanish
police quickly interdicted this network
arresting 56 individuals of which fourteen remain in custody (p 175).
The second group is that of home grown young people who have
gone to Iraq and Syria to fight for – or provide material support to – Daesh.
According to Napoleoni (2014, p xv) Daesh promises a return to the golden age
when the Caliphate controlled an area which stretched from the Middle East into
Europe and Africa: it was the centre of the civilised world. It is to this
group that many young people are now being drawn. As explained to Parliament by
the Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop:
All too often I am
approving passport cancellations or suspensions for a string of 16- to
17-year-olds who are seeking travel, always with ludicrously large amounts of
cash, bogus stories of holidays and frequently without their family’s
knowledge. In recent days, I have implemented emergency suspensions as the
young person concerned is actually at the airport about to depart. (Bishop, 2015)
Jake Bilardi is a notable example. He comes from a
background where his parents had separated whilst he was at school: a well-recognised
stress/strain factor. He resided with his mother and was estranged from his
father: Bilardi only reengaged with his father after his mother had died and he
had converted to Islam (Smith and Rice, 2015). Angela Scaffidi of Senate SHJ --
where Bilardi undertook work experience -- described him as ‘a very special
young man’ who was interested in Australian and international affairs (Clark,
2015). Being a loner, Birardi spend most of his time online and it was here
where he was radicalised (Smith and Rice, 2015). Of significance is Bilardi has
left behind a blog that details his radicalisation:
I was beginning to learn that
what the media was feeding us was nothing but a government-sponsored distortion
of the reality. It was from my investigations into the invasions and
occupations of both Iraq and Afghanistan that gave birth to my distain for the
United States and its allies, including Australia. … It was an obligation upon
every able Muslim to fight.
(Levy, 2015)
Mayfield (2015) outlines that “… Jake Bilardi’s likely death
as a suicide bomber in Iraq’s Ambar Province appears to have generated feelings
of ambience and sadness in addition to the outrage more commonly associated
which such an act.”
Mayfield goes further outlining how the International Crisis
Group’s Jean-Marie Guehenno believes that “… jihadism has replaced Marxism, and
that … [Daesh] and Al Qaeda had replaced groups such as the Red Brigades … as
the attraction for ‘lost souls’.” Karagiannis (2012, p 102) concurs arguing
that Islam became the successor to communism as the bastion of rebels with a
number of similarities: both prioritise group goals over individual interests
and have a vision of a perfect just society. Emerson (2009, p 22) takes this
argument further stating that Islamists – in particular al-Qaeda – have recast
the leftist anti-imperialism into an Islamic agenda. On the other hand, Phares
(2008, p 219) argues that there are parallels in the anti-Semitic and anti-U.S.
government rhetoric of the extreme right-wing with that of Islamists. It is
rather problematic to believe that Islamists could be successors to both right
and left-wing radicals; however, those linkages might just provide an insight
into why it has such a wide spread appeal and the possibility of deradicalision.
Terrorism.
Terrorists according to Cary (2009, p 13) are “. . . determent to impose their will upon others. Unlike nation states . . . terrorists resort to violence as the first and final solution.” There is significant academic literature that describes the motivations of terrorism. In a survey of academic writings on terrorism, Schmid and Jongman found the following key elements:
- use of violence;
- symbolic choices of
victim;
- performance by an
organisation;
- advanced planning;
- operational seriality;
- an absence of moral
restraint;
- political motivation; and
- the use of fear and
anxiety. (Weimann, 2006, p 21)
- nationalist or separatist
agendas;
- retaliation or revenge for
real or perceived injury;
- protest government policy;
and
- defend animal rights.
These motivations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Johnson (2002, p 8) defines blowback as the ‘unintended
consequences of polices’ a term originally used internally by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) but has now been adopted and applied to international
relations in general. This is the rebounding of policy against the interests of
its perpetrator (‘Jihadist Blowback?’ 2008, p 41). The first CIA
blowback was the 1953 coup d'état in Iran. In 1953 the CIA orchestrated a coup
d'état replacing the elected left leaning Prime Minister Mossadegh with the
repressive Mohammad Reza Shah, the Shah of Iran. A line can be drawn connecting
these events, the 1980 Islamic Revolution and the evolution of modern terrorism
--particularly Hezbollah and Hamas – furthermore, as a consequence recent events
in Syria and Iraq (Kinzer, 2003, p 202). Veldhuis and Lindenberg (2012, p 239)
go further arguing that in the pursuance of short-term security goals many
governments are neglecting the how their policies are preventing them from
achieving the long-term security goals: in essence causing significant
blowback.
Radicalisation, deradicalisation and disengagement.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu states that a person is an extremist
or radical when they “… do not allow for a different point of view; when you
hold your own views as being quite exclusive, when you don’t allow for the
possibility of difference…”(Davies, 2009, p 185). According to Lindekilde
(2012, p 110) study of radicalisation has its “… roots in security concerns and
debates over integration…” without a clear uniformly agreed definition. This is
significant as before one can determine if terrorists can be deradicalised one
needs to be able to determine if they are in fact radicalised.
Veldhis and Staun outline that definitions of radicalisation
evolve around two elements: (i) violent radicalisation involving the active
pursuit or acceptance of violence to achieve a goal; and (ii) broader
radicalisation where emphasis is placed upon active pursuit of acceptance of
far reaching change in society (Borum (a), 2011, p12). The first of these
elements appears to be more specifically targeted towards terrorism. For
instance Borum (2011(b), p38) defines radicalisation as the development and
adoption of extremist beliefs that justify violence. Khosrokhavar (2013, p 286)
goes further by describing it as “… a process by which an individual or a group
adopts a violent form of action as a consequence of extreme political, social,
or religious ideologies questioning the prevailing social, cultural and
political order.” Ozerdem and Podder (2011, p 65) outline that “… youth in such
[western] countries are motivated to join violent organizations due to feelings
of alienation from larger society, and as a function of socio-economic
deprivation.”
Logic would suggest that deradicalisation is the reversal of
the radicalisation process: the prefix ‘de-’ means the “… undoing, reversing,
or ridding of … the action, condition …”(Landau, 1984, p 163). However, deradicalisation
is a more complicated scenario than just reversing the causes of
radicalisation. Cronin (2006, p 18) outlines that terrorist organisations end
because of:
1.
capture of the leader;
2.
failure to transition to the next generation;
3.
achievement of the group’s aims;
4.
transition to legitimate political process;
5.
undermining of popular support;
6.
repression; and
7.
transition from terrorism to other forms of violence.
Furthermore, despite the lack of an organisation Ozerdem and
Podder argue that the former members have “… violence entrenched reality of
their lives, and it is the most destructive element since reliance on violence
to secure what a free society can be secured institutionally or rightfully,
remains a key transformative process…”(Ozerdem
and Podder, 2011, p 71) Therefore, it is argued that deradicalisation not
only needs to address the causes of radicalisation but also rehabilitate the
effects of that radicalisation: the actions and experiences the individual has
been exposed.
The complicated nature of deradicalisation is highlighted by
Horgan (2008, p 6) whom argues that what many people describe as
deradicalisation is in fact disengagement. He outlines that why people join a
terrorist group has little to do with what they do whilst in the terrorist
group and what they do has little to do with why they leave (p 3).
Deradicalisation is a process which involves both physical disengagement and
psychological disengagement: it is the psychological transformation which is
the most important. This involves the changing of ideas and beliefs: resulting
in disillusion with their organisation or a change in priorities (p 4). For
instance, the end of the Cold War saw many Marxist terrorists change their
priorities with the changed geopolitical environment.
Examples of Deradicalisation
The first example to be examined is the Irish. The Irish are
an interesting case as they have experienced two significant periods of radicalisation
in the twentieth century which each concluded with community reconciliation:
the first being the period leading up to
and following home rule from 1919 to 1923 and the ‘troubles’ from 1969 to 1998 (Sullivan,
2011, p 304). From as early as 1867 the Irish had learnt that they could
counter the superiority of the British Army through the use of prisoners,
martyrs and causing fear on the British mainland with the use of explosives (Hannah, Clutterbuck and Rubin, 2008, p 18). Ireland
achieved dominion status – similar to that of Australia, Canada and New Zealand
at the time – in 1921 which was short of the independence sought by the republicans:
this caused a split in the political elite and ultimately a civil war (Pelling,
1974, p 268). Rather than the abandonment of nationalist goals, emergence of
moderate politicians and changed external environment which Kissane (2012, p
46) argues are traditional catalysts to deradicalisation it was early elections
which fulfilled this role. Those who did not participate in the process quickly
lost influence and had to reconcile with popular support: this was ultimately a
reversal of public support for violent action (p 53).
A change in community perception led to the Good Friday
Agreement bring to an end the troubles in Northern Ireland. Neumann and
Kleinmann (2015) argue that it should be remembered that in the 1990s the
threat of the IRA was centre stage whilst Islamist slowly grew in strength.
During this time significant funds were received by the IRA from none other
than the United States and New York in particular (Kushner, 2011, p 207): an
interesting revelation in that in less than a decade New York would become the centre
of radicalisation modelling following the events of 9/11 (Borum (a), 2011, p 40).
Utilising the violent extremist risk assessment model Beardsley and Beech
(2013, p 10) assess the radicalised terrorists of the IRA had high scores for
alienation, perceived injustice, lack of empathy and dehumanization. It is
argued by the International Crisis Group (2007, p 7) that the segregation of
prisoners by British authorities saw heightened radicalisation through the
preservation of organisational hierarchies and the creation of virtual training
camps within prisons. Following the Good Friday Agreement prison release was
used as an incentive for deradicalisation and participation in the peace
process. Horgan and Braddock (2010, p 269) highlight that “… should an
individual violate the conditions of release, or the group to which he/she was
affiliated break the ceasefire, the member would have been expected to serve
out their sentence[.]” This is a significant ‘leap of faith’ that those
radicalised would toe the line; however, Horgan and Braddock argue that the
strengths of the affiliated groups would use their extreme authoritarian power
to ensure compliance. Those released were provided with support to reintegrate
into the community through an European Union sponsored program which provided
them with training in pre-employment, business planning and social skills (p
270). Of the 450 people who participated in the release program, only 30 had
their release revoked and 15 of those were due to terrorist related activity
(p271). It appears that the strength of the terrorist groups -- who
subsequently moved to peace promoters – played a significant role in insuring
the success of the process: this was a strength which was achieved by maintaining
their power within the prison system.
However, the maintenance of organisational ties is not
always a positive for deradicalisation. Ganor and Falk (2013, p 124) outline
how in Israel they aim to reduce the threat of terrorist prisoners by partial
deradicalisation: this involves the realignment from Islamist groups which
oppose a peace process with Israel, to one which supports such engagement with
a hope that they will eventually disengage from terrorist activities.
Furthermore, the authorities aim to lessen intensity of involvement along a
continuum consisting of in descending order:
1.
institute attack;
2.
operational;
3.
administrative;
4.
membership;
5.
active support; and
6.
passive support (p 126).
This is achieved through the engagement with families and
provision of training. The key for the Israelis is to get the terrorist to
acknowledge that their actions were immoral through engagement with moderate
clergy. Treating prisoners humanly builds upon vocational training and
education to provide an alternative to militant organisations upon release;
however, this is extremely difficult given that Palestinian society glorifies
terrorism. Furthermore, Ganor and Falk
(p 128) argue the process is undermined by the periodic exchange of prisoners
between the Israelis and militant groups: if one maintains affiliation and
allegiance to the radical organisation one is more likely to be nominated for
release: the complete opposite to what had occurred in Ireland.
On the theme of prisons an interesting example emerged in
Egypt with the renouncement of violence by Egyptian Islamic Group: this is an
important example due to the connection between that group and the current
al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri. In 1995 the Egyptian Islamic Group cooperated with
Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad in an attempted assassination of then Egyptian
President Mukarak: the crackdown that followed would see imprisonment of many
involved and others go into exile (Hoffman, 2007, p 24). By 1997 rumours began
to circulate that the jailed members of the Islamic Group were about to
renounce violence and this occurred in July that year when one by one the
leaders of the group renounced violence in open court (Wright, 2008). This isolated
Zawahiri who attempted to persuade his comrades to continue the fight stating “if
we are going to stop now, why did we start?”; however, when these attempts
failed with the assistance of al-Qaeda he ordered the massacre of 58 tourists
at Luxor (‘The Path’, 2011). Wright
(2008) argues that blowback occurred with this strategy as the population
abandoned their support violent struggle, and Islamic Jihad in particular, leaving
it without popular base eventually necessitating its merger with al-Qaeda.
The Yemini Committee for Dialogue was established in 2002
following the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole and fears that if they did not ‘do
something’ the United States would take action themselves (Horgan and Braddock,
2010, p 273). Porges (2010, p 28) argues that the aim of the program was to
reintegrate those who had fought against the Soviets back into society. The
process was grounded in a religious dialogue resting “… on the idea that
because the political killing of civilians has ‘faulty intellectual foundations,’…
the core tenets of terrorism can be disputed, thus weakening attitudes presumed
to underpin support for terrorist activity. … [they] …invite the participants
to discuss include the place of jihad in Islam and its justifications, the
relations of the Muslims and others, the concept of the State, government, and
ruler rights within Islam…”(Horgan and Braddock, 2010, p 275) If the militants renounced their allegiance
to jihadist groups and accept the legitimacy of the government they would be released
from prison (Jones and Morales, 2012, p
217). However, there is not a consensus as to how successful the program was:
despite regime claims of overwhelming success, Jones and Morales (p 217) states
that it has a 40% success rate whilst Horgan and Braddock (2010, p 276) argue
the recidivism rate is not verifiable. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has
changed the dynamics of the country making any further development of this
program unlikely with the regime tittering on collapse (Peters and Besley, 2014,
p 3).
With the same catalyst, Saudi Arabia established a
counselling program after the Riyadh compound attack (Horgan and Braddock, 2010,
p 276). Amborst (2014, p 244) argues that “… by Western Standards, and the
understanding of many Saudi citizens, Saudi Arabia is a theocracy … for some
conservative Salafists it is a state governed by opportunists who bend Sharia
law as they please[.]” The Saudi program according to Soloman (2014, p 36) is
focused upon combatting thought with thought: the aim of the program is
to achieve repetition and the abandonment of terrorist ideologies (Jones and Morales, 2012, p 217). Horgan and
Braddock (2010, p 277) outline that the “… Saudis developed a series of
measures intended to de-legitimize what the Kingdom deemed incorrect and/or
violent interpretations of the Qu’ran.” Furthermore, they make a comparison
with the Yemini scheme stating that the “… religious subcommittee is comparable
to the Yemini [Committee for Dialogue] … in that it is composed of clerics,
other religious experts, and university charged with engaging the participants
in open discussion about their experiences and interpretations of the Qu’ran
and Islamic duty.” This scheme involves psychological assessments and treatment;
however, it is the clerics who take the lead. The program is designed to be
holistic, addressing the needs of the former terrorist particularly focusing on
their families: the government provides financial support to their families and
assistance with the provision of schooling for their children; furthermore,
there is an aftercare program upon release (Hannah, Clutterbuck and Rubin, 2008, p 37). The
Saudi’s claim that their program has a 80-90% success rate, however, release
and participation is limited to only Islamist sympathises – not those engaged
in terrorism -- which would account for the willingness to disengage (Soloman,
2014, p 36).
In contrast to the formal programs in the Middle East, those
in South East Asia have been ad hoc but inventive. The al-Qaeda affiliate
Jemaah Islamiya has been particularly active in the countries of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Abuza, 2003, p 153). No other country
has been affected as much as Indonesia: a terrorist attack – in this case the
2002 Bali bombings – would serve again as a catalyst for action. Their program,
according to Horgan and Braddock (2010, p 273) is a police centric approach
which operates on an ad hoc basis. The International Crisis Group (2007, p 12) illustrate that the program came
out of an aim by the police to identify Jemaah Islamiya members whom may be
willing to cooperate and provide them with intelligence. Unique to this program
is the use of former terrorist like Nasir bin Abbas. He uses his notoriety as a
former Jemaah Islamiya leader to meet with youths and former terrorists to
explain that they have “… misunderstood the Islamic struggle and the meaning of
jihad...” (Horgan and Braddock, 2010, p 273) According to former Australian
Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty it is this very respect as a Jemaah
Islamiya leader which enables bin Abbas to achieve results. Another former
Jemaah Islamiya member and Bali bomber Ali Imron takes a different approach
arguing that although there is nothing wrong with their interpretation of
Islam, they have been in error as they “… did not know for sure … the status of
those we targeted, nor did we try to persuade them by other means…”(‘The Path’,
2011, p 13) Indonesian officials provide both financial and logistical support
to the families of participants: assistance to travel and also with support of
children. However, Horgan and Braddock (2010, p 274) argue that it “… is
probably inaccurate and certainly premature to consider this true
‘deradicalisation.’”
Fellow ASEAN member, the Philippines has also taken a unique
approach to deradicalisation. The United States and Australia consider the
southern Philippines to be a safe haven for terrorists with a number of
Islamist groups active in the region (Jones
and Morales, 2012, p 213). Jones and Morales (2012, p 214) outline that
the “… main driving force behind terrorism in the region can be attributed to
socioeconomic marginalisation and retaliation to repressive military action,
rather than religion and militant extremist ideologies.” Moreover, this is a phenomena
connected to blowback from governmental
neglect and repression. There is not a structured process of deradicalisation
in the Philippines, in fact the prison system in that country lacks the
resources to adequately manage the basic system. As a consequence prison gangs
are used to maintain control within the prisons with regular meetings between
the Bosyo (gang leader) to discuss issues such as disputes, conditions to general
prison operations (p 221). Terrorist inmates in the new Bilibid Prison are not
given any special status but rather are distributed amongst the gangs. Jones
and Morales (2012, p 220) argue that the association with these gangs are a
positive engine for “… the purpose of disengagement and eventual
de-radicalisation of terrorist inmates …” with them slowly being incorporated
into the new group which acts as a substitute for the terrorist group. The
Pilipino strategy has similarity with that in Northern Irelands: the control of
the gang is used to limit recidivism. In essence, the criminal association is
seen as preferable to a terrorist association along the lines of the Israeli
attempts to lessen the intensity of terrorist involvement. In many respects the
Pilipino strategy has in isolation evolved into a hybrid of these two
institutionised schemes.
Criminological theories
Although the majority of these examples have focused on
terrorists in the prison environment it is argued that these schemes are as
applicable to terrorists outside of these institutions. For instance, it is
conservable that Jake Bilardi -- one of the examples introduced at the
beginning of this paper – would have benefited from the engagement which all of
these programs provide and the elimination of the causes of alienation. Of
particular use would have been the Indonesian counselling with a former
disgruntled Jihadist something which the British Security Service (MI5) looks
favourably upon (Jones, 2015).
Developmental crime prevention relates to reducing the risk
factors for a person committing criminal acts: social, economic, familial,
educational, biological and environmental characteristics. If a person is
subjected to stresses or strains in their developmental years their connectiveness
and adherence to social norms will be detrimentally affected (White &
Haines, 2000). Labelling theory sees crime as a construct of those with the
power to label a particular action as being criminal. This labelling has a
psychological effect on those whose actions are labelled as criminal or deviant
in that they are affected by the stigma of the label that directs their future.
This was illustrated by a study conducted by William Chambliss (1976, p 155) at
a United States high school looking at two different groups -- the Roughnecks
and the Saints – who both were involved in anti-social behaviour. The
difference between the two groups is that the Roughnecks came from lower social
economic backgrounds and were labelled as ‘no hopers’ whilst the Saints were seen
as good kids, young leaders, and were able to kept their behaviour relatively
secret by travelling to other towns. Being labelled as ‘bad’ reduced the
opportunities available to the Roughnecks who could not shake off their ‘bad’
label and eventually lived up to that label.
It is argued that there are parallels with the disengagement of terrorists. Each of
the previous examples has not attached negative labelled to those involved in
terrorism. The key factors of these interventions was the openness to the
belief that they could change and facilitate that change: in the majority of
cases providing support to the ‘whole’ person including support to their
families and addressing their psychological needs. It should be remembered that
following 7/7 the United Kingdom Home Office identified “… the root causes of
terrorism … [are] discrimination, deprivation and alienation facing British
Muslims, UK foreign policy, the plight of Muslims across the world...”
(Warraich and Nawaz, 2005, p 75). Although not necessarily designed to do so
strategies such as those in Ireland have been beneficial to social inclusion: unfortunately
this approach is not always followed.
Recently in Australia there has been focus on radicalised
people like Bilardi going to Iraq and Syria to fight with Daesh. In response
the Australian Government introduced -- and the Parliament enacted -- the Counter-Terrorism
Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (the bill). The
explanatory memorandum to the bill states that:
The Bill implements
the Government’s responses to the evolving national security landscape and in
particular, the threat posed by Australians engaged in, and returning from,
conflicts in foreign States. The latter category of persons, collectively
referred to as foreign fighters’, may have fought alongside listed terrorist
organisations in overseas conflicts and return to Australia with enhanced
terrorism capabilities and ideological commitment.
In essence this legislation made it an offence to go to a
declared area -- the area where Daesh operates was quickly declared – which is
a strict liability offence with the alleged person having the onus to show that
they were in the declared area for humanitarian or family reasons. Recently
Australians who had joined Daesh requested assistance to leave the group and
possibly assist in the deradicalisation process along the lines of the
Indonesian process (Iggulden, 2015). However, the Prime Minister Tony Abbott
rejected this notion stating that they were no longer welcome in Australia: “If
you go abroad to become an Islamist killer, well, we’re hardly going to welcome
you back into this country … You will be arrested. You will be prosecuted and
you will be jailed, because it is a serious criminal offence under Australian law
to fight with terrorist groups overseas…” (Iggulden, 2015). Unfortunately,
Australia has taken the view that those who become involved with groups such as
Daesh cannot be rehabilitated nor is there an environment created which would allow
deraticalisation of the likes of Bilardi or members of a local terrorist group
such as that involved in M-11
This paper has
explored the possibility that terrorists can be deradicalised. The answer to
this question is yes, however, it is dependent on the society to which they
belong. When the populous that has previously supported terrorists turn their
back on the tactic – like in Ireland and Egypt – then this will be a push
factor towards disengagement and ultimately deradicalisation. The end of the
cold war also demonstrated that a changing in the geo-political environment –
particularly the removal of grievances – can facilitate the same process;
therefore, it is important for policy makers to assess the long term
consequences of decisions such as military intervention or cohersive criminal
justice innitative to avoid blow back. However, in places such as the
Palestinian territories where the populous is supportive and glorifies
terrorism then they are problematic: it is argued that the same applies to a
subculture remains focused on terrorist activities – such as the Islamist
online movement – then more is required by authorities. The examples presented
here make it clear that engagement by a respected and legitimate authority on
the subject – such as a religious leader or former terrorist – can be very
successful in facilitating the process. When the person is taken as a whole –
with the provision of support and training opportunities – the negative labels
are nullified. Most importantly
authorities need to be prepared to engage and accept the former terrorist back
into society – just like the parable of the prodigal son of biblical times –
unfortunately something the Australian Government is presently not prepared to
consider.
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